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Abstract—Underlay femtocells have recently emerged as a
key technology that can significantly improve the coverage and
performance of next-generation wireless networks. In this paper,
we propose a novel approach for interference management that
enables a number of femtocells to cooperate and improve their
downlink rate, by sharing spectral resources and suppressing
intra-tier interference using interference alignment. We formulate
a coalitional game in partition form among the femtocells and
propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation. Using
our approach, the femtocell access points can make individual
decisions on whether to cooperate or not, while maximizing
a utility function that captures the cooperative gains and the
costs in terms of transmit power for information exchange. We
show that, using the proposed coalition formation algorithm, the
femtocells can self-organize into a network partition composed of
disjoint femtocell coalitions, which constitutes the recursive core
of the game. Simulation results show significant gains in terms
of average payoff per femtocell, reaching up to 30% relative to
the non-cooperative scheme.
Index terms: coalitional games; femtocell networks; game theory;
partition form; interference alignment; recursive core.
I. INTRODUCTION
The deployment of femtocell access points (FAPs) is en-
visioned to be a key solution for providing high wireless
data-rates, offloading the macrocell traffic and enhancing the
coverage of existing networks (e.g., LTE or WiMAX) [1]
[2]. Nevertheless, the deployment of FAPs underlaid with
existing macrocell wireless networks faces several challenges,
notably at the level of interference management and resource
allocation. In co-channel deployments, FAPs reuse the spectral
resources of the macrocell network which can lead to severe
interference at both the femtocell and the macrocell tiers [3]
[4]. Hence, it is of interest to propose adaptive interference
management techniques, namely at the femtocell level [5].
Recently, interference alignment (IA) has been introduced
as a coding technique that can achieve high multiplexing gains
within interference limited environments [6], [7]. Essentially,
IA is based only on linear precoding at the transmitter side
and zero-forcing equalization at the receiver [7]. In [6], [8], the
authors analyze the degrees of freedom resulting from using IA
over different channels and for an arbitrary number of antennas
per user. The authors in [6], [8] have shown that IA enables
wireless users to have an interference-free communications
at the cost of each user exploiting only half of the available
degrees of freedom. Additional results on the achievability of
the total number of degrees of freedom are presented in [9],
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[10]. In essence, [9], [10] show that, by aligning all interfering
signals in the same subspace from the point of view of each
receiver, interference can be suppressed simply through zero-
forcing equalization. In [11], an intra-cluster IA technique is
applied to a clustered wireless ad hoc network to increase the
probability of successful transmission. In summary, existing
work in the area of interference alignment has shown that
significant performance gains can be achieved by combining
IA techniques with cooperative schemes in which FAPs can
coordinate their transmission so as to suppress interference
among each other [6], [8–10].
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
approach for interference management in femtocell networks
in which the femtocells can cooperatively perform interfer-
ence alignment so as to reduce their mutual interference,
and, consequently, improve their overall performance. In the
proposed approach, we study the cooperative strategies of the
femtocells that enables them to form clusters inside which
co-tier interference is suppressed using IA. We formulate the
problem as a coalitional game in partition form in which the
FAPs are the players taking autonomous decisions to create
coalitions so as to maximize a utility function, which captures
both the benefits from cooperation, in terms of downlink
transmission rates, and the costs, in terms of transmit power for
information exchange. We solve the game using the concept
of a recursive core which is a key solution for coalitional
games in partition form. Using simulations, we show that
the proposed approach enables the FAPs to cooperate and
self-organize into a stable partition while yielding significant
performance gains relative to the non-cooperative scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the proposed system model for cooperative interfer-
ence alignment. In Section III, we formulate the cooperative
femtocells problem as a coalitional game and discuss its
properties. In Section IV, we present the simulation results
and, finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
Notations: In the rest of the paper, The log refers to log2. Bold
uppercase letters (e.g., A) denote matrices, bold lowercase
letters (e.g., a) denote column vectors and normal letters (e.g.,
a) denote scalars. The identity matrix is denoted by 1. The
letter EA denotes the expectation operator over A. Symbol C
represent the set of complex numbers and (·)† denotes the
Hermitian transpose operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the downlink transmission in a single macrocell
network (e.g., LTE-Advanced or WiMAX) in which N fem-
tocell access points (FAPs) are deployed. These FAPs use an
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA)
technique over a portion of the macrocell spectrum that is
reused in the femtocell tier (the remaining part of spectrum
is assigned to macrocell users). Let N = {1, ..., N} denote
the set of all FAPs. Every FAP i ∈ N serves Li femtocell
user equipments (FUEs). Let Li = {1, ..., Li} denote the set
of FUEs served by an FAP i ∈ N . The FUEs belonging
to the same FAP are scheduled on orthogonal subcarriers.
Each transmitter (resp. receiver) is equipped with Nt (resp.
Nr) transmit (resp. receive) antennas. For any transmission
between an FAP i and one of its FUEs k ∈ Li, the discrete-
time received signal at FUE k, at a given time instant, is:
yk =
√
γikHikVi si +
∑
j∈N , j 6=i
√
γjkHjkVj sj + nk, (1)
where γik and γjk denote the signal-to-noise and the
interference-to-noise ratio at FAP k ∈ Li, respectively. [Hik]
are Nr ×Nt complex matrices representing the MIMO chan-
nels between FAP i and FUE k. si ∈ Cdi×1 represents the
di-dimensional signal from FAP i and Vi ∈ CNt×di denotes
the associated precoding matrix. di represents the degrees of
freedom of the transmitter-receiver pair (i.e., the multiplexing
gain), for the transmitted message. Similarly, sj ∈ Cdj×1
and Vj ∈ CNt×dj are the dj-dimensional signal and the
precoding matrix pertaining to interfering FAP j. Further, nk
represents the noise vector at receiver k which is considered as
a zero mean unit variance circularly symmetric additive white
Gaussian noise vector (AWGN).
In existing networks, FUEs belonging to different femtocells
are typically scheduled non-cooperatively, i.e., without coordi-
nation among the FAPs. Consequently, neighboring FAPs can
schedule their transmissions in the downlink over the same
subcarrier hence causing interference to one another and limit-
ing the downlink performance of their FUEs. To overcome this
problem and reduce the femtocell-to-femtocell interference,
FAPs have an incentive to cooperate and coordinate their trans-
missions using advanced communication techniques such as
interference alignment. In this respect, given the signal to noise
and interference ratio (SINR) feedbacks from their FUEs, a
group of FAPs can decide to form a coalition in which a
spatial interference alignment scheme is used so as to mitigate
the downlink intra-femtocell interference. In essence, the FAPs
that are member of the same coalition S ⊆ N cooperate in
order to adjust the spatial structure of their transmitted signals
so as to avoid interference among themselves. Note that, even
though the FAPs that are members of a given coalition S ⊆ N
are able to mitigate interference among each other, they are
still affected by non-aligned interference from FAPs (from
other coalitions) in N \ S. Thus, given a coalition S of FAPs
that are performing cooperative interference alignment, we
can separate the contributions pertaining to the different types
(aligned or non-aligned) of interference as follows:
yk =
√
γikHikVi si +
∑
j∈S, j 6=i
√
γjkHjkVj sj
+
∑
l∈N\S
√
γlkHlkVl sl + nk (2)
Hence, interference alignment is achieved at an FUE k ∈
Li, where FAP i ∈ S, if and only if there exists a zero-forcing
interference suppression matrix Uk ∈ CNr×di , such that:{
U
†
kHjkVj = 0, j ∈ S, j 6= i
rank
(
U
†
kHikVi
)
= di, di > 0
(3)
One must note that, by considering that the channel coef-
ficients in Hjk are identically and independently distributed,
the existence of a solution for the above IA problem solely
depends on the dimensions of the problem (|S|,Nt,Nr) as
discussed in [12]. For instance, when the target multiplexing
gain di at the FUE is equal to one, a solution to the system
(3) exists for the interference channel composed by |S| − 1
interfering transmissions plus the useful signal if and only if
Nt +Nr ≥ |S| .
Moreover, to find the precoding and interference suppres-
sion matrices one can use existing iterative algorithms such
as in [13, Algorithm 1], [12]. Therefore, the interference from
members of the same coalition can be suppressed, yielding,
after projection, the following signal at receiver k:
y¯k=
√
γikU
†
kHikVisi +
∑
l∈N\S
√
γlkU
†
kHlkVl sl+U
†
knk, (4)
where the remaining interference term is due to non-aligned
transmissions in the coalitions formed outside S, i.e., in N \S.
For ease of analysis, we assume that the signals sl are
not known at the receiver and that Gaussian code books are
used, which is a common assumption in the literature [14].
As a result, the interference Gaussian. Note that, even when
the aggregate noise is not Gaussian, this assumption remains
reasonable since it constitutes a lower bound on the ac-
tual capacity. Further, we focus on the contribution of the
interference-plus-noise as in (4), and analyze an expression
of the achievable rate assuming complete knowledge of the
channel conditions. In this respect, we utilize the mutual
information between the transmitted and received signal given,
for an FAP i ∈ N as follows:
I(si, y¯k, πN ) = h(y¯k, πN )− h(y¯k, si, πN )
= log det
(
π eQy¯k
)− log det (π eQt¯k), (5)
where we let t¯k denote the interference-plus-noise in (4) (i.e.,
the last two summands), while Qy¯k and Qt¯k represent the
covariance matrices of the received signal and the received
interference-plus-noise, respectively. In particular, if we denote
H˜lk =
√
γlkU
†
kHlkVl, ∀(l ∈ N \ S), the covariance matrices
can be expressed by:
Qt¯k = Esl,nk [tk, t
†
k] =
∑
l∈N\S H˜lk QlH˜
†
lk + σ
2
n1
Qy¯k = Esi,sl,nk [y¯k, y¯
†
k] = H˜ik QiH˜
†
ik +Qt¯k ,
(6)
where Qi represents the covariance matrix of the signal si.
Moreover, we use the fact that, for the received noise nk,
Enk [nk, n
†
k] = σ
2
n1. Note that, Qt¯k is present in the expression
of Qy¯k . In addition, in order to compute the achievable
rate, we use that log det(π e(A + B)) − log det(π e(B)) =
log det(1 + AB−1) if B is invertible. Since we consider an
interference-limited scenario, we neglected the noise term in
(6). The average achievable rate at receiver k in coalition
S ⊆ N :
Rik
(
si, y¯k) = EH
{[
log det
(
1+ H˜ik QiH˜
†
ik·
·
( ∑
l∈N\S
H˜lk QlH˜
†
lk
)−1)]} (7)
For performing cooperative IA, the FAPs belonging to the
same coalition need to exchange information which, in turn,
incurs a cost for cooperation. In this context, we consider a
cost in terms of the transmit power that each FAP spends
to send its information to the other coalition member. This
information exchange phase occurs via a wireless broadcast
transmission over a control channel such as the X2 interface
[5]. Given the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, we
consider that each FAP i ∈ S exchanges its information to the
other coalition member by transmitting its data to the farthest
cooperating FAP in the coalition. Hence, given a coalition S,
the power needed to exchange information between an FAP
i ∈ S and the farthest cooperating FAP iˆ ∈ S is:
P¯i(ˆi) =
ν0 · σ2n
|Hiˆi|2
, (8)
where ν0 is the minimum SNR required at the potential
coalition partner iˆ, and |Hi,ˆi|2 represents the channel gain
between FAPs iˆ and i, over the common control channel.
Further, FAPs need to satisfy the power constraint Pi =
Qsi = E[s
†
i si] ≤ Pmax 1, while still accounting for the pilot
transmit penalty. The constraint on the total transmit power
thus becomes:
Pi + P¯i(ˆi) ≤ Pmax. (9)
Clearly, the cost defined in (8) depends on the spatial
distribution of the FAPs in the network and on the minimum
SINR required. We consider that the FAPs constraint in (9)
also stands for the transmission during information exchange
(e.g., over the X2 interface). Without loss of generality, the
coalition formation framework presented in this article can
also be applied to different cost functions 2.
III. FEMTOCELL COOPERATION AS A COALITIONAL GAME
A. Coalitional Game Concepts
In order to mathematically model the femtocell cooperation
problem, we formulate a coalitional game between the FAPs.
Due to co-channel interference, the rate achieved by the FAPs
members of any coalition S that forms in the network is
affected by the cooperative behavior of the FAPs outside S,
i.e., the FAPs in N \ S. In other words, the performance of
a coalition depends on the partition of the network πN (πN
is a partition of N ) to which it belongs. Given a partition
πN of N , the total rate that any coalition of FAPs S ∈ πN
achieves, depends on the external interference that is generated
by the coalitions of FAPs in N \S. Hence, given this property,
1Clearly, the same constraint applies to the covariances of the interferers
j, and it is still denoted with subscript j instead of i.
2For example, since femtocells are connected to each other through the X2
interface, the proposed cost can be replaced by a cost for synchronization or
for trading additional information such as bandwidth usage or priority policies.
one suitable framework for modeling the femtocell cooperation
problem is that of a coalitional game in partition form with
transferable utility (TU) defined as follows [15]:
Definition 1: A coalitional game in partition form with
transferable utility (TU) is defined by a pair (N , v) where
N is the set of players, and v is a value function that assigns,
for every partition πN and every coalition S ⊆ N , S ∈ πN ,
a real number that represents the total utility (benefit) that
players in S can achieve.
Given the set of FAPs N , our next step is to define a
suitable value function v(S, πN ) that reflects the total benefit
that coalition S achieves when acting within partition πN . For
any coalition S, each FAP i ∈ S obtains a certain payment
from its served FUEs that is proportional to the amount of
rate offered to these FUEs. Hence, any FAP i ∈ S charges a
certain price αik per every unit rate offered to a given FUE
k ∈ Li. As a result, given a partition πN , for any coalition
S, the value function v(S, πN ) can be defined as the total
achieved revenue as follows:
v(S, πN) =
|S|∑
i=1
Li∑
k=1
αikRik
(
si, y¯i, πN ), (10)
where Rik
(
si, y¯i, πN ) is the rate achieved by FUE k served
by FAP i ∈ S and αik is the price per unit rate that FAP
i ∈ S charges to FUE k. Note that, the rate Rik
(
si, y¯i, πN ) is
function of the interference generated, not only by the FAPs
inside S but also by the FAPs in N \ S, and, thus, depends
on the partition πN that takes place in the network. The
dependence of the rate on the actual partition implies that,
for a coalition S, (10) is a function of the coalitions that the
FAPs in N \ S form and, thus, the game is in partition form.
The value in (10) represents the total revenue that a coalition
S obtains by acting cooperatively controlled by a pricing
factor αik. For example, this revenue can represent payments
that the FUEs make to their serving FAPs. Clearly, the revenue
is a transferable quantity that can be apportioned in any
way between the coalitional members. Hence, using (10),
we clearly have a game with TU and our next step is to
propose a fair scheme for dividing the revenue of a coalition
S between its members. In fact, for TU games, beyond the
total revenue that a coalition S achieves as per (10), one has
to also characterize the payoff xi that each player (i.e., FAP)
in the coalition S receives, i.e., the benefit of every member in
the coalition. For this purpose, without loss of generality, we
adopt an egalitarian fair payoff division method using which
the extra value given by the coalition formation is equally
divided among the players in the coalition. Thus, the payoff
for FAP i in any coalition S can be found from (10) by an
egalitarian fair division, as follows:
xi(S, πN ) =
1
|S|

v(S, πN )−∑
j∈S
v({j} , πN )

+ v({i} , πN ).
(11)
Note that the payoff is zero if the power used for information
exchange in the coalition exceeds the limit given by (9).
We also note that the egalitarian fair distribution does not
imply dividing the whole utility equally but rather the extra
benefits (relative to the non-cooperative case) equally, while
conserving individual rationality, i.e., ensuring that an FAP
that is member of S does not get less benefit than when acting
non-cooperatively.
Furthermore, given two payoff vectors x,y ∈ RN , we write
x >S y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S ⊂ N and for at least one j ∈ S
xj > yj . We also define an outcome as couple (x, πN ), where
x is a payoff vector resulting from a partition πN . Finally, let
Ω(N , v) denote the set of all the possible outcomes of N .
Given these definitions, we have a coalitional game in
partition form (N , v) between the FAPs and our objective is to
propose a solution that allows the FAPs to self-organize and
form coalitions while increasing their revenue (i.e., their total
rate) given the costs for cooperation as in (10).
B. Recursive core
In order to solve the proposed femtocell coalition formation
game in partition form, we use the concept of a recursive core
introduced and discussed in [16]. The recursive core is a key
solution concept for coalitional games that have dependence on
externalities, i.e., in partition form. In essence, the recursive
core draws a parallel with the well-known core concept of
games in characteristic form [16]. The recursive core is a
suitable outcome of a coalition formation process that accounts
for externalities across coalitions, which, in the considered
game, are represented by the mutual interference between
coalitions of FAPs. To define the recursive core we need to
first introduce the concept of a residual game:
Definition 2: A residual game (R, v) is a coalitional game
in partition form defined on a set of playersR, after the players
in N \ R have already organized themselves in a certain
partition. Players outside R are called deviators, while the
players in R are called residuals.
Consider a coalitional game (N , v) and let S be a certain
coalition of deviators. Then, let R = N \ S denote the set
of residual players. The residual game (R, v) is defined as a
game in partition form over the set R. Clearly, a residual game
is still in partition form and it can be solved as an independent
game, regardless of how it was generated as discussed in [16].
To better present this concept, we will provide an intuitive
introduction. For instance, when some deviators reject an
existing partition and decide to reorganize themselves into
a different partition, their decisions will, in general, affect
the payoff of the residual players. As a result, the residual
players form a new game that is part of the original game
(e.g., the game over the whole set N ), but with a certain
part of the partition (composed by deviators) already fixed.
In consequence, one of the main attractive properties of a
residual game is its consistency as well as the possibility of
dividing any coalitional game in partition form into a number
of residual games which, in essence, are easier to solve. In
fact, any game in partition form can be seen as a collection of
residual games, each one of which can be solved as if it was
the original one. The solution of a residual game is known as
the residual core which is defined as follows:
Definition 3: The residual core of a residual game (R, v)
is a set of possible game outcomes, i.e., partitions of R that
can be formed.
One can see that given any coalitional game (N , v), residual
games are smaller than the original one and therefore computa-
tionally easier to analyze. Given any coalitional game (N , v),
the recursive core solution can be found by recursively playing
residual games, which, in fact, yields the following definition
as per [16, Definition 2]:
Definition 4: The recursive core of a coalitional game
(N , v) is inductively defined in four main steps:
1) Trivial Partition. Let (N , v) be a coalitional game. The
recursive core of a coalitional game where N = {i} is
composed by the only outcome with the trivial partition
composed by the single player i: C({i} , v) = (v(i), i).
2) Inductive Assumption. Proceeding recursively, suppose
the recursive core C(R, v) for each game with at most
N − 1 players has been defined. Now, we define the
assumption A(R, v) about the game (R, v) as follows:
A(R, v) = C(R, v), if C(R, v) 6= 0 ; A(R, v) =
Ω(R, v), otherwise.
3) Dominance. An outcome (x, πN ) is dominated via a
coalition S if for at least one (yN\S , πN\S) ∈ A(N\S, v)
there exists an outcome ((yS , yN\S), πS ∪ πN\S) ∈
Ω(N , v) such that (yS , yN\S) >S x.
4) Core Generation. The recursive core of a game of |N |
players is the set of undominated outcomes and we denote
it by C(N , v).
Note that, in Definition 4, the concept of dominance in step
3) inherently captures the fact that the value of a coalition
depends on the belonging partition. Hence, it can be expressed
in the following way: given a current partition πN and
the respective payoff vector x, an undominated coalition S
represents a deviation from πN in such a way that the resulting
outcome ((yS , yN\S), πS ∪ πN\S) is more rewarding for the
players of S, compared to x.
Since a partition uniquely determines the payoffs of all the
players in the game, the recursive core can be seen a set of
partitions that allow the players to organize in a way that
provides them with the highest payoff. It is worth stressing that
the recursive core verifies the properties of rationality, well-
definition and efficiency [16]. In detail, with rationality it is
intended that players never choose an inferior (i.e., dominated)
strategy, therefore, they always pursue a profitable strategy.
The recursive core is also well-defined because when it exists,
its solution is unique. Furthermore, efficiency is a consequence
of the fact that there is no preference in the set composed by
the recursive core, and thus, all the included partitions are
equivalent in terms of individual payoff. Moreover, In [16,
Lemma 10], the author proves that the term core is justified,
since the recursive core is, as previously mentioned, a natural
generalization of the core in characteristic form, to games
with externalities. Consequently, when applied to a game in
characteristic function form, the recursive core coincides with
the core, as classically defined [17].
Given these properties, once a partition in the recursive
core takes place, the players have no incentive to abandon
it, because any deviation would be detrimental. As a result,
Algorithm 1 Distributed coalition formation algorithm for
interference alignment in femtocell networks
Initial State: The network is partitioned by πN = N = {1, . . . , N} with
non-cooperative FAPs
Proposed Coalition Formation Algorithm
repeat
Phase I - Interferer Discovery
Each FAP i computes the current payoff xi(S, πN ) as in (11)
Each FAP collects RSSI of the neighboring FAPs from each of its own FUEs
For each of the occupied subcarriers, each FUE sorts the interfering FAPs from the
stronger to the weaker
Phase II - Femtocell Coalition Formation
for all Interferers in the list do
Each FAP sequentially engages in pairwise negotiations with the strongest
discovered interfering FAPs, to identify potential coalition partners, which satisfy
the power constraint in (9)
The payoff in (11) is updated, accounting for the new cost P¯i (ˆi)
Each FAP joins the interferer which ensures the maximum payoff
until any further growth of the coalition does not result in a payoff enhancement
of at least one FAP, without decreasing the other FAPs payoffs.
end for
Outcome of this phase: Convergence to a stable partition in the recursive core;
Phase III - Coalition-level Interference Alignment
Within each coalition, femtocell-to-femtocell interference alignment operations
described in Section II are initiated
a partition in the recursive core is also stable since it is a
partition which ensures the highest possible payoff for each
one of the players who have no incentive to leave this partition.
In [16], the author shows that the existence of the recursive
core requires at least one residual core (and not all of
them) to be nonempty. This means that at least a subset of
the players in the network must have defined a preference
on how to organize themselves, i.e., how to partition the
network. In detail, an empty residual core reflects a case in
which the players of the corresponding residual game do not
identify any preferred network partition, or in our proposed
FAP cooperation scenario, can equivalently choose between
cooperating or not.
Therefore, for the proposed FAPs coalitional game, the
emptiness of a residual core does not happen and this can be
justified as follows. As per Definition 4, the recursive core is
evaluated through a sequence of residual games over subsets
of players (i.e., FAPs in our case) in the network. When a
given residual core is empty, it is still possible to solve a larger
game which contains it, as a residual game, in a nested fashion.
Hence, the existence of the recursive core is in fact guaranteed
as long as one can find at least one residual core that is
nonempty. Thus, the recursive core is a solution concept that
exists for any game in partition form, unless all the residual
cores are empty. This latter case is very unlikely since it would
represent a network in which FAPs are indifferent (i.e., have
the same payoff) between states in which they are actually
suppressing interference (e.g., cooperatively using interference
alignment).
In a nutshell, for the proposed FAPs coalitional game, one
can use the concept of residual cores in order to find a partition
in the recursive core, i.e., a stable and efficient partition, as will
be further described in the next section. To reach a partition
in the recursive core, the FAPs can use Algorithm 1.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
For system-level simulations, we consider a single hexag-
onal macrocell with a radius of 500m within which N FAPs
are randomly deployed. Each FAP i ∈ N serves Li = 2 FUEs
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Fig. 1. Average individual user payoff as a function of the number of
subcarriers dedicated to the femtocell tier for different number of FAPs.
scheduled over Li orthogonal subcarriers which are typical
values as in [5]. FAPs and FUEs are equipped withNt = Nr =
2 antennas. An open access policy is adopted at each FAP. We
set each FAP’s maximum transmit power to Pmax = 10 dBm,
which includes both the power for data transmission and the
cost for cooperation in (8). Transmissions are affected by
distance dependent path loss shadowing according to the 3GPP
specifications [18]. Moreover, a wall loss attenuation of 12 dB
affects femtocell-to-femtocell transmissions. The considered
macrocell has 110 available subcarriers, each one having a
bandwidth of 180 KHz, and dedicates 16 OFDMA subcarriers
to femtocell transmissions. For both femto users and MUEs,
we assume that power control fully compensates for the
path loss. The signal-to-noise ratio required for information
exchange is ν0 = 5 dB. The parameters αik are set to 1 by
simulation choice. To leverage channel variations, statistical
results are averaged on 10000 simulation rounds.
Figure 1 depicts the average individual FAP payoff as
a function of the number of subcarriers dedicated to the
femtocell tier, for N = {100, 200, 300}. This figure shows that
the ratio between number of FAPs and number of dedicated
subcarriers plays a key role, as interference becomes critical
over a high congested spectrum. For all of the considered
network sizes, the cooperative and non-cooperative strategies
lead to similar payoffs when a large portion of spectrum is
available, due to the low density of interferers for a given
subcarrier. Conversely, the benefit from coalition formation
becomes relevant in a high congested spectrum and, in the case
of N = 300 allows for a maximum spectrum saving of 38%
with respect to the non-cooperative case. In addition, Figure 1
demonstrates that the proposed coalitional game model has a
significant advantage over the non-cooperative case, increasing
with N and resulting in an improvement of up to 30% for
N = 300 and 16 subcarriers.
In Fig. 2, we show the average and the average maximum
size of the FAP coalitions in the recursive core for a target SNR
for information exchange of ν0 = 5 dB. Fig. 2 shows that, for
small networks, the FAPs have low incentive to cooperate,
and, thus, the recursive core is mainly populated by singleton
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Fig. 2. Average and average maximum coalition size as function of the number
of FAPs.
coalitions. In contrast, as N grows, the density of FAPs and
the interference level increases, thus, a cooperative strategy
becomes more rewarding, as seen through the increase in the
average size of the coalitions. As a matter of fact, by forming
coalitions, nearby interfering FAPs can still utilize the same
subcarriers and suppress interference via alignment. However,
the maximum size of a coalition is limited by the cost for
cooperation as well as the inherent efficiency of IA.
Figure 3 shows the growth of the number of coalitions,
i.e., the size of a partition in the recursive core, while the
number of FAPs increases. Additionally, the average num-
ber of iteration in the proposed algorithm is observed. The
network is initially organized in a non-cooperative structure
where each FAP represents a singleton coalition, therefore the
number of coalitions equals the number of FAPs (grey dotted
line in Figure 3) and, since interferers are out of range of
cooperation, the number of iterations is minimum. Initially, for
N < 50 cooperation seldom occurs, due to the large distance
between mutual interferers. As N increases (50 < N < 300),
the network topology changes with the emergence of new
coalitions. The number of iterations depend on the number
of potential coalitional partners which satisfy the constraint in
(9). Therefore, Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the incentive
towards cooperation becomes significant when the femtocells’
spectrum becomes more congested and femtocells are densely
deployed in the network.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a cooperative framework
aimed at interference mitigation in a femtocell network. We
have formulated the problem as a coalitional game in partition
form and proposed a distributed coalition formation algorithm
that enables FAPs to decide on whether to cooperate or not,
while accounting for the cost in terms of power for information
exchange. We have shown that the proposed algorithm reaches
a stable partition, lying in the recursive core of the studied
game. Within every formed coalition, we have adopted an
interference mitigation technique based on the alignment of
interfering signals from members of the same coalition. Re-
sults have shown that the femtocell performance is critically
limited by the interference, therefore, the proposed cooperative
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Fig. 3. Average number of coalitions and average number of iterations per
FAP until convergence to a stable partition in the recursive core.
strategy among interfering femtocells can provide significant
gains, in terms of average payoff per femtocell, reaching up
to 30% relative to the non-cooperative case.
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